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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
Case No. 990375-CA 
ISAAC J. HOLLANDS, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from his convictions for Attempt to Receive or Transfer a Stolen 
Vehicle, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-1 A-1316(2) (1998) 
and §76-4-101 (1995), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable Denise P. Lindberg, Presiding. This Court has jurisdiction of this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(3)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue: Did the trial court act within its discretion in sentencing defendant to serve his 
sentence for attempting to receive or transfer a stolen vehicle consecutively with his prior 
sentences for attempted operation of a clandestine drug lab and possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a restricted person? 
Standard of Review: A sentence will not be disturbed unless it exceeds that 
permitted by law or the trial court has abused its discretion. State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987 
(Utah 1986). An appellate court finds an abuse of discretion only if "'no reasonable [person] 
would take the view adopted by the trial court.'" State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 
(Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)). 
STATUTE 
The interpretation of the following statute is determinative of the appeal or of central 
importance to the appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (Supp. 1998): 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty 
of more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive 
sentences for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run 
concurrently unless the court states in the sentence that they 
shall run consecutively. 
* * * 
(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant 
in determining whether to impose consecutive sentences. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising 
out of a single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Isaac J. Hollands was charged in a August 14, 1997, information with 
receiving or transferring a stolen motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1998); failure to stop at the scene 
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of an accident, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-30 (1998); and 
false identity to a police officer, a class C misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
8-507 (1995) (R. 1-3). On February 9, 1999, defendant pleaded guilty to attempting to 
receive or transfer a stolen motor vehicle, a third degree felony. R. 25-33; 54: 2,5. The two 
misdemeanor charges were dismissed. R. 54:5. On April 1,1999, court sentenced defendant 
to a term of 0-5 years and ordered the sentence to run consecutively with a sentence 
defendant was then serving. R. 52: 11. Defendant timely appealed. R. 37. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The instant crime: While knowingly driving a stolen Mitsubishi Eclipse, defendant 
wrecked the car in an accident on July 25, 1997 (R. 2, 25, 26, 53: 2A, 3A).1 After the 
accident, defendant and his passenger, McCarty,2 fled the scene of the accident on foot. R. 
53: 2A. They were eventually subdued by two citizens and then arrested by a Salt Lake 
County Deputy Sheriff. R. 53:2A. Defendant told the deputy that he had been driving the 
car involved in the accident and gave the deputy a false name. R. 53:2A. A 1996 Mitsubishi 
lrThe volume R. 53 contains the pre-sentence investigation report (PSI). The PSI is 
in two parts. Page numbers referring to the original PSI, which was prepared for 
sentencing defendant on his convictions for attempted operation of a clandestine drug lab 
and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted persons, are followed with a "B" 
herein. Page numbers referring to the addendum to that report, which was prepared for 
the sentencing at issue in this case, are followed with an "A" herein. 
2The PSI does not give the first name of the "Mr. McCarty" who was the 
defendant's passenger that evening. R.53:2A. However, the name "Justin McCarti" 
repeatedly appears later in the PSI in connection with the attempted operation of 
clandestine drug lab conviction for which defendant was sentenced to a term 1-15 years 
for before sentencing for this incident. R: 52:5; 53:3B. 
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Eclipse had been stolen 18 days earlier from a Murray car dealership. R. 2, 53: 2A. 
Defendant knew the car he was driving was stolen. R. 25,26; 53: 3 A. Both the defendant 
and McCarty had a substantial amount of cash in their possession and police found 
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in McCarty's possession. R. 53: 2A. 
Defendant was charged with receiving or transferring a stolen motor vehicle, a second 
degree felony, and failure to stop at the scene of an accident and giving false identity to a 
police officer, both class C misdemeanors. R. 1-2. He was released on August 8, 1997, 
booked again August 13, 1997, and released on bail August 19, 1997. R. 10; 53:4A. 
Defendant's criminal history: At the time of the accident, defendant had 13 
juvenile referrals including assault, shoplifting, and a theft which would amount to a second 
degree felony in the adult system. R. 53: 7B-9B. Additionally, defendant has two additional 
class B misdemeanor convictions for carrying a concealed weapon and possession of drug 
paraphernalia from April, 1995. R. 53: 7B-9B. Possession of a Controlled Substance 
charges arose from the same April, 1995 incident, but were dismissed through plea 
negotiations. R. 53: 9B. 
Defendant also had pending charges at the time of the car wreck for attempted illegal 
possession of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor (reduced from illegal possession 
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony); possession of drug paraphernalia, a class 
B misdemeanor; and giving false information to a police officer, a class C misdemeanor, all 
stemming from a January 1997 incident. R. 53:10B. Defendant missed an arraignment for 
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the January charges in March of 1997. R.53:10B. In September of 1997, defendant did not 
report to Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) for a Pre-Sentence Interview needed to 
complete sentencing for the January charges. Id. 
Defendant's subsequent criminal activity: Not only did defendant have a 
considerable criminal record before his arrest in July of 1997, but he continued to add to it 
after his release on bail in August. R.53: 11-12B. Defendant was convicted of driving on 
suspension and operating a motor vehicle without insurance, both class B misdemeanors. 
However, these charges seem to be connected with the July 25 incident, since defendant was 
incarcerated for that offense on the date listed for these offenses. R. 53:11B. Defendant was 
also charged with possession of stolen property, a third degree felony, but the state declined 
to prosecute those charges. R.53:1 IB. Further, on September 3,1997, less than one month 
after his release for the charges surrounding the vehicle accident at issue here, defendant was 
charged with driving on suspension, driving without registration, and operating a motor 
vehicle without insurance. R. 53: 11B. Those charges were still pending at the time of 
sentencing in this case. Id. 
Less than three months after his release for charges stemming from driving a stolen 
car and fleeing the scene, defendant was arrested and charged with further crimes. R. 53: 2B. 
On October 21, 1997, defendant was stopped for a traffic violation while driving in 
Wyoming. Id. After failing to produce a driver's license, proof of insurance, and a vehicle 
registration, defendant was arrested. Id. The vehicle was registered to Denise Warner and 
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Justin McCarti. R. 53: 3B. A records check on Justin McCarti revealed McCarti had been 
arrested numerous times in the Salt Lake Valley for possession of controlled substances and 
currently had one possession charge pending in Salt Lake City. Id. When the vehicle was 
impounded and searched, Wyoming authorities found a substance that field tested positive 
for amphetamine. Id. While searching defendant, police found an envelope containing a 
large amount of cash and receipts from various stores in the Salt Lake Valley which listed 
items commonly used in making methamphetamine. Id. Those receipts eventually led 
authorities to obtain a search warrant for a storage unit in Ogden, Utah. Id. at 3B-4B. In that 
unit, officers found a large, operational clandestine drug lab, which had been used. Id. at 4B. 
The unit also contained a stolen assault-style rifle, a semi-automatic handgun, several of the 
items listed on the receipts that were found on defendant, and a receipt in the name of the 
defendant for the tires on the Mitsubishi defendant was driving when arrested in Wyoming. 
Id. at 4B. The keys found on defendant matched the padlock from the storage unit. Id. 
Defendant admitted he had rented the unit under a fictitious name, had purchased the 
items and taken them to the drug lab in the storage unit, had assisted in preparing items to 
be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, and was present during the manufacture 
of the methamphetamine. Id. On April 23, 1998, after plea negotiations defendant was 
sentenced to a term of 1-15 years for attempted operation of a clandestine drug lab, a second 
degree felony; and a term of 0-5 years for possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person, a third degree felony, to be served concurrently. R. 53: 5A. 
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Sentencing on the instant charges for attempted stolen vehicle: On February 9, 
1999, while serving his sentence for the convictions attempted operation of a clandestine 
drug lab and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, defendant pleaded 
guilty to the reduced charge at attempted receiving or transferring a motor vehicle, a third 
degree felony stemming from the car accident in July of 1997. R. 25-33; 53:5A; 54:5. 54: 
5. The failure to stop and false identity charges were dismissed. R. 54: 1-2. The prosecutor 
agreed to recommend that the sentence in this case be served concurrently with terms 
defendant was then serving on his attempted operation of a clandestine drug lab and 
possession of a weapon by a restricted person convictions. R. 27B.3 
Defendant was sentenced on April 1,1999. R. 52:1. Defense counsel argued to the 
court that since defendant had never been given the opportunity to be on probation, had never 
been in jail before, and has a serious drug problem that had never been addressed through 
formal treatment, the sentence for the July, 1997 offenses should run concurrently with those 
he was then serving. R. 52: 6-8. Defendant asserted that he had been attending a substance 
abuse class while in prison and was working on his GED. R. 52: 9. 
The trial court stated that it had read the PSI and found that defendant's criminal 
history was "not quite as lily white as would appear," noting that defendant had thirteen 
3The record contains two pages marked "27". The second page marked "27" (page 
4 of the plea agreement) will be referred to as "27B" herein. 
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juvenile referrals before he entered the adult system.4 R. 52:10. The court noted that "even 
assuming the criminal history assessment argument that [defendant] made" and even though 
"there is something to be said for the fact that [defendant had not] been given the prior 
opportunity of probation, [that] given [defendant's] history and given the nature of the 
offenses [defendant] committed," it was "not sure [it] disagree[d] at all with the action of the 
court in [sentencing defendant to prison for his clandestine drug lab and possession of a 
weapon by a restricted person convictions]." R. 52: 10. The court further stated that just 
because defendant had begun his criminal career path "at the top" instead of working his way 
up, she was not sure that defendant "deserve[d] a break for that." R. 52: 10. Accordingly, 
the court sentenced defendant to a zero-to-five year term, to be served consecutively with the 
sentences for the attempted possession of a clandestine drug lab and possession of a firearm 
by a restricted person. R. 37; 52: 11. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's imposition of a zero-to-five year prison term to be served 
consecutively with terms of imprisonment defendant was then serving on other closely 
connected crimes was reasonable and within the court's broad discretion. Even with the 
imposition of a consecutive prison term, defendant still faced a minimum prison sentence one 
year less than had he been sentenced for a second degree felony, for which there was ample 
defendant, bom on March 26,1976, was twenty-three years old at sentencing. R. 
53:1A. 
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evidence. Moreover, the sentencing judge duly considered the gravity and circumstances of 
the offense, together with the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of defendant, as 
required by statute. In light of those factors, the court's sentence was reasonable and within 
its broad discretion. In short, it cannot be said that no reasonable [person] would take the 
view adopted by the trial court." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION BY 
ORDERING DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY 
AFTER IT CONSIDERED THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE AND 
DEFENDANT'S PAST CRIMINAL HISTORY, POST-ARREST 
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, AND INABILITY TO CONTROL HIS OWN 
BEHAVIOR OUTSIDE A PRISON SETTING. 
Subject to the limits prescribed bylaw, sentencing "rests entirely within the discretion 
of the [trial] court" State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210,1219 (Utah 1984). Where a defendant 
has been found guilty of multiple felony offenses, the trial court may impose concurrent or 
consecutive sentences. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1). The trial court may impose 
consecutive sentences for multiple crimes even if the offenses were committed in the course 
of a single criminal episode. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(5). In determining whether or not 
to impose consecutive sentences, the trial court must "consider the gravity and circumstances 
of the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (Supp. 1998). 
Although the courts have opined that Utah's sentencing statute favors concurrent 
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sentencing, see State v. Stnink, 846 P.2d 1297,1301 (Utah 1993),5 an appellate court will not 
overturn a trial court's sentencing decision unless it is clear that the trial court abused its 
discretion. See State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978); State v. Schweitzer, 943 
P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App. 1997). As the supreme court in Gerrard observed, "[t]o do 
otherwise would have a chilling effect on the trial court which has the main responsibility 
for sentencing." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. An abuse of discretion maybe found if the trial 
court fails to consider the statutory factors or if the sentencing is otherwise inherently unfair 
or clearly excessive. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651. However, an "appellate court can properly 
find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by 
the trial court." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887; Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651. 
A review of the record in this case reveals that the court did not abuse its discretion 
in ordering that defendant's sentence run consecutive to the one-to-fifteen year and the zero-
to-five year terms he was then serving on related felonies. The consecutive term was 
reasonable not only in light of the statutory factors, but also in light of the sentence that 
defendant otherwise would have served had he been convicted on the primary offense 
charged. 
5In so observing, the supreme court in Strunk cited Section 76-3-401(1) which 
provides: "Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the court states in the 
sentence that they shall run consecutively." Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1301. 
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A. The Trial Court's Sentence Imposing a Consecutive Prison Term 
of Zero-to-Five Years for Attempt to Receive a Stolen 
Vehicle Was Reasonable. 
In addition to two misdemeanor counts, defendant was also charged with receipt or 
transfer of a stolen vehicle, a second degree felony. R. 1. As such, he faced an indeterminate 
sentence of at least one-to-fifteen years, if convicted. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 
1998). However, pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pled guilty to a reduced charge of 
attempt to receive or transfer a stole vehicle. R. 25-33. Accordingly, rather than facing a 
sentence of up to fifteen years if convicted on the second degree felony, defendant received 
a sentence whose maximum was five years. 
Considering the much heavier sentence defendant was facing if convicted as charged, 
it cannot be said "that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." 
Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. Although defendant pled to reduced charges, he admitted to 
knowing that he was driving a stolen vehicle. R. 54:5. In light of this fact, imposition of the 
consecutive term, resulting in a possible zero prison term—one year less than what he would 
have served had he been convicted of the second degree felony—was reasonable and within 
the discretion of the court. See State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) (observing 
that facts relating to dismissed charges are properly considered at sentencing); see also State 
v. Hines, 663 So.2d 199, 202 (La. App. 1996) (observing that a trial court may consider a 
plea bargain when imposing sentence). 
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B. The Trial Courts Properly Considered All Legally Relevant 
Factors in Sentencing. 
As noted above, section 76-3-401(4) requires the court to "consider the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant." Failure to consider these factors can result in an abuse of discretion. Schweitzer, 
943 P.2d at 651. However, the statute requires only that the court consider these factors, not 
that it give them equal weight. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4); see also Howell, 707 
P.2d at 118 ("Although a sentencing judge will give considerable weight to the circumstances 
of the crime, a judge may also consider other factors/'); State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 458 
(Utah App. 1993) ("the trial court did not abuse its discretion by placing more emphasis on 
punishing defendant rather than rehabilitating him"). As such, "the exercise of discretion in 
sentencing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court," which endeavors to 
impose "a proper sentence based on the facts and law before it." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, the record in this case reveals that the trial court duly 
considered all statutory factors and acted within its discretion in imposing the sentence. The 
trial court, on its own motion, ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation report 
(PSI). R:54:5-6. The PSI not only provided information regarding the gravity and 
circumstances of the offense, but also regarding defendant's history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs. After considering the information in the report, the trial court imposed 
consecutive sentences. 
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1. The Trial Court Properly Considered the Gravity 
and Circumstances of the Offense. 
Defendant recognizes the court's consideration of his convictions for attempted 
operation of a clandestine drug lab as a serious offense, but then downplays the significance 
of that offense as "unremarkable" (in which he acted only as "the procurer of materials") and 
fails to mention the extensive criminal conduct surrounding his convictions for that offense 
and for attempt to receive a stolen vehicle. Br. of App. at 10.6 
On July 25, 1997, defendant totaled a car he knew to be stolen, damaging two other 
cars, and fled from the scene of the accident apparently without any consideration for the 
welfare of people in the other cars, and upon being apprehended gave a false name to 
authorities. R. 53:2A. Defendant's companion, arrested numerous times for possession of 
controlled substances, was carrying methamphetamine, and both defendant and his passenger 
were carrying a large amount of cash. R. 53:2A, 3B. There was a strong indication that 
defendant's passenger was the individual with whom defendant operated a clandestine drug 
lab after defendant's arrest for possession of a stolen vehicle. Id 
6Although defendant pleaded guilty to only attempted operation of a clandestine 
drug lab, the evidence of his actual participation in the methamphetamine production was 
overwhelming. R. 53.2-5B. Methamphetamine is a Schedule II controlled substance 
under both state and federal law. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4(2)(b)(iii)(B) (Supp. 1998); 
21 U.S.C.A. § 812(c) (1981). Schedule II drugs have a "high potential for abuse," which 
"may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence." 21 U.S.C.A. § 812(b)(2). 
Moreover, the United States Congress has concluded that the illegal distribution and 
improper use of these and other controlled substances "have a substantial and detrimental 
effect on the health and general welfare" of the public. Id, at § 801(2). 
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Only three months later, on October 21,1997, defendant rented a storage unit under 
a false name, procured numerous items he knew were to be used to manufacture 
methamphetamine in that storage unit, helped to prepare some of the materials for 
manufacture, and was present when the drug was cooked. R. 53:2-5B. Further, defendant 
knew from personal experience there were guns in the lab. R. 53: 5B. Defendant pled guilty 
to attempted operation of a clandestine drug lab and possession of a dangerous weapon by 
a restricted person. R. 53: 2B. 
The combination of the circumstances—demonstrating defendant's willingness to 
accept stolen goods, lie to authorities, evade capture, associate with a known drug user, and 
thereafter continue to use a dangerous drug and participate in its manufacture—warrants 
consecutive sentencing for defendant. The trial court plainly considered these factors when 
it remarked that "given the nature of the offenses that [defendant] committed" she did not 
disagree with the sentence for the clandestine drug lab conviction, that defendant had entered 
the adult system with a "bang," by "starting] at the top" rather than working his way up on 
his "criminal path," for which he "did not deserve a break." R. 52: 10. 
2. The Trial Court Properly Considered Defendant's Criminal History. 
The PSI, which the trial court reviewed, outlines defendant's criminal history, which 
began in 1990 when defendant was thirteen years old, and continued without significant 
interruption to the present R. 54:10; 53: 7-12B. Among defendant's thirteen juvenile 
referrals are a theft which would amount to a second degree felony if committed by an adult 
14 
and an assault with a risk of substantial bodily injury. R. 53: 7-9B. In 1992, defendant 
accepted a non-judicial settlement for shoplifting. R. 53:8B. Three years later, as a nineteen-
year-old adult, defendant entered a guilty plea for carrying a concealed weapon and 
possession of drug paraphernalia in which a possession of a controlled substance charge was 
dismissed. R.53:9B. Two years later, at the time of sentencing for the offense in this case, 
defendant still had charges pending for attempted possession of a controlled substance, 
possession of drug paraphernalia, giving false information to a police officer, driving on 
suspension, driving without registration, and operating a motor vehicle without insurance, 
offenses arising out of two separate incidents. R. 53:10-13B. Equally telling is that between 
defendant's arrest in this case on July 25, 1997, and his arrest for operation of a clandestine 
drug lab and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person on October 21, 1997, 
defendant was arrested for possession of stolen property, a third degree felony, on August 
3, and for driving on suspension, driving without registration, and operating a motor vehicle 
without insurance on September 3. R. 53:1 IB. See State v. McKenna, 728 P.2d 984, 986 
(Utah 1986) (because a trial court has broad discretion in sentencing, it can consider the 
arrest record of the defendant); Miller v. State, 709 N.E.2d 48,49 (Ind. App. 1999) (citations 
omitted) ("Although an arrest record is not evidence of prior criminal history, c[t]his 
information is relevant to the court's assessment of the defendant's character and the risk that 
he will commit another crime and is therefore properly considered by a court in determining 
sentence.'"). 
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Defendant argues that the trial court failed to credit his non-violent past, citing State 
v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998) and State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993). The 
comparison fails. In Strunk, the court held that consecutive sentences for convictions arising 
out of one criminal episode were unwarranted due to the complete absence of violence in 
Strunk's previous record, his extreme youth (sixteen at the time of the crime), and the 
possibility that concurrent sentences would keep him in prison for twenty-four years before 
being eligible for parole. 846 P.2d at 1301-02. In Galli, the defendant also had no history 
of violence, and the gun used in his robberies was incapable of inflicting serious injury. 967 
P.2d at 938. These factors, along with Galli's law-abiding conduct for three years after the 
crimes and that consecutive sentences would leave Galli ineligible for parole for fifteen 
years, led the court to hold that consecutive sentences were inappropriate. 967 P.2d 930. 
In contrast, defendant had a prior conviction for assault with a risk of substantial 
bodily injury. R. 53:8B. Additionally, defendant had two convictions for carrying a 
concealed weapon and a conviction for attempted operation of a drug lab, an intrinsically 
dangerous activity involving the production of a dangerous drug known for its violent 
behavioral effects. R. 53:5A, 9B; supra n.7. 
In addition to its review of the PSI, the trial court observed that defendant's 
background was not "lily white", made reference to his "13 juvenile referrals" and felony 
convictions, and his unabashed foray into the adult system. R. 52: 10. The trial court 
declared that "given this history", consecutive sentences were appropriate. R. 52: 10-11. 
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3. The Trial Court Considered Defendant's 
Character and Rehabilitative Needs. 
Reviewing the record and observing defendant, the trial court correctly recognized 
that much of defendant's conduct reflected negatively on his character, particularly on his 
character for telling the truth and acknowledging his accountability, and demonstrated that 
prison was the best environment to address his rehabilitative needs. In this case, defendant 
fled from the scene of the accident in which he was driving a stolen car, apparently without 
thought to the welfare of others involved in the car accident, and then lied to authorities 
about who he was. R. 53:2A. Shortly after being released on bail in this incident, defendant 
was twice again apprehended for traffic offenses and then arrested on significant drug and 
weapons charges. R. 53:4A, 11-13B. Defendant initially denied his involvement in the 
operation of the methamphetamine lab, admitting his participation only when confronted 
with overwhelming evidence. R. 53:2-5. 
Defendant claims the trial court failed to credit his good intentions to better himself, 
presumably evidenced by his confession and his commitment to drug counseling and 
obtaining his GED. Br. of App. at 12-13. In fact, the court undoubtedly recognized that 
defendant acknowledged his guilt because his flight and giving false identification was 
powerful circumstantial evidence that he knew the car he was driving was stolen. More 
importantly, defendant's statement to the sentencing court that he was involved in drug 
counseling was, at best, manipulative and possibly an outright lie. R. 52:9. The PSI in this 
case, filed in the court on March 31, 1999, only one day before the sentencing on April 1, 
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states that defendant had never received any substance abuse counseling, which includes the 
entire seventeen-month period following his arrest on the clandestine drug charge on October 
21, 1997. R. 53:1 A, 5-6A. Additionally, the court was probably impressed that defendant 
was delinquent on support payments for his two-year-old out-of-wedlock child, was 
uncertain of how much each required payment was, and had been physically abusive towards 
his "fiancee." R. 53:15-17B. Thus, the court would not likely have been swayed by the 
argument that defendant had demonstrated any genuine sense of responsibility for his life, 
as he argues on appeal, citing Galli. Br. of App. at 13. However, the defendant in Galli, in 
contradistinction to defendant in this case, showed after the offense obedience to the law, 
assistance to his neighbors, and ability to improve himself. See Galli, 967 P.2d at 938. 
Defendant also argues that the trial court failed to consider his rehabilitative needs, 
asserting that all his legal troubles stem from his drug addiction. Appellant's Br. at 14; R. 
53:18B. However, the trial court's review of the PSI, which discussed defendant's lengthy 
addiction to marijuana (from age thirteen) and methamphetamine (daily use from age 
eighteen), belies the argument. A sentencing court may consider a defendant's refusal to take 
any responsibility for his drug habits. In State v. Schweitzer, the defendant asserted "his past 
arrests involve only the abuse of drugs and alcohol." The court of appeals found that the 
evidence in that case showed "that defendant's substance abuse causes his complete lack of 
control and judgment," and that although the defendant had "repeatedly been diagnosed as 
a substance abuser, yet, he [had] failed to make an effort in his own rehabilitation." 943 
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P.2d 649, 652 (Utah App. 1997). Despite Schweitzer's argument that his rehabilitative 
needs clearly indicated a rehabilitation program, not incarceration, this Court held that 
consecutive sentencing was appropriate. 943 P.2d at 651-652. 
Likewise, here defendant blames his legal troubles on his addiction, but for years 
failed to seek any counseling or "make an effort in his own rehabilitation." Id.; R. 53: 18B. 
Defendant did not pledge to "get a job . . . quit using drugs, and quit hanging around people 
who use drugs" until he had been arrested and incarcerated for the Clandestine Drug Lab 
charges. R. 52: 23B. Defendant committed the clandestine drug lab offense after he was 
arrested for Possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia in 
January of 1997 and arrested for receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle in July of 1997. 
R. 53: 10-12B. Defendant might have used the court-ordered probation in July of 1997 as 
an opportunity to obtain drug counseling, but he did not. R. 53:10B. 
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court failed to recognize that a consecutive 
sentence inordinately deprived the Board of Pardons of the flexibility required to address his 
rehabilitative needs for an additional thirty months after he completed his one-to-fifteen year 
sentence on his attempted operation of a clandestine drug lab conviction. Br. of App. at 14-
15. In support, he likens his circumstances to those of the defendants in, Strunk, Galli, and 
State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995). 
In Strunk, the court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment for first degree 
murder and consecutive minimum mandatory terms of fifteen years to life for child kidnaping 
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and nine years to life for aggravated sexual abuse of a child. Strtink, 846 P.2d at 1298. The 
supreme court vacated the consecutive sentences which would have resulted in the 
defendant's incarceration for no less than 24 years. Id.at 1301-02. SeealsoGalli, 967P.2d 
932-33, 938 (imposition of mandatory fifteen year term before the defendant could be 
considered for parole)7; State v. Smith, 909 P.2d at 244 (imposition of sixty year sentence 
before Board of Pardons could monitor the defendant's progress). Unlike any of the 
defendants in the foregoing cases, defendant in this case was sentenced to an indeterminate 
zero-to-five year term consecutive to a one-to-fifteen year on which he had already served 
a year. R. 37; 53:1 A, IB.8 Under section 77-27-9(1 )(b), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1998), the 
Board may release defendant even before the minimum term has been served if mitigating 
circumstances justify the release. See also Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, 808 
P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991) (the Board of Pardons has the "unfettered discretion" to release 
defendant after any minimum period of the indeterminate sentence). Thus, although AP&P 
7The supreme court in Galli vacated a sentence requiring the defendant to serve 
three consecutive, indeterminate prison terms of five years to life. 967 P.2d at 938. The 
decision was based in part on the conclusion that concurrent sentences would "allow[] the 
Board of Pardons and Parole to release [Galli] from prison after five years if he has 
shown genuine progress toward rehabilitation." Id. This conclusion, however, was based 
on the false premise that a consecutive, indeterminate sentence would foreclose the Board 
from granting an early release. Id. Yet, section 77-27-9 provides the Board with the 
flexibility to parole a defendant before he serves the minimum term of an indeterminate 
sentence if mitigating circumstances justify the early release. 
Additionally, defendant had been incarcerated for 194 days prior to sentencing 
following his arrest on the clandestine drug lab charge, R. 53:7B, for which he was likely 
given credit. 
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computed a thirty month "intermediate sanction" for defendant, see 53:addendum p.2A, the 
Board might release defendant at the same time defendant completes his sentence on the 
clandestine drug lab conviction if defendant has made sufficient progress toward 
rehabilitation. 
In sum, defendant has failed to show that the trial court did not consider the gravity 
and circumstances of the offense, and his history, character and rehabilitative needs when 
imposing consecutive sentences. The PSI set out substantial information required under 
section 76-3/401. R. 53:1-8A, 1-23B, plus addenda. Additional information was presented 
at the sentencing hearing. R. 52:1-12. The trial court demonstrated its familiarity with the 
PSFs contents, listened to defendant and defense counsel at the sentencing hearing, 
considered evidence of defendant's all the statutory requirements, and correctly determined 
that consecutive sentencing was appropriate. R. 52:10-11. Defendant has failed to show 
that the trial court failed to consider those factors to the degree that no reasonable person 
would take the view adopted by the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should affirm the trial court's order 
imposing a sentence consecutive with those defendant was already serving. 
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ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not request 
that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £*_ day of October, 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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